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1Chapter
Analysis of Network Protocols: 
The Ability of Concealing the 
Information
Anton Noskov
Abstract
In this chapter, we consider the possibility of hidden data. Since today all net-
work services rely on the basic protocols, the use of untestable and redundant fields 
may become a big problem. All of the modern data protocols have vulnerabilities. 
An attacker can use the reserved fields or field use undocumented way. Depending 
on the data transmission method and detection mechanisms, the technology for 
assessing the possibility of transmitting hidden information is changing. The work 
is of great practical interest for the implementation of systems to detect and prevent 
intrusions and data leaks in it. The authors determine the possibility of transmis-
sion and detection sends using a comparative evaluation of the fields in the packet 
with the values recommended in the standard protocol.
Keywords: network protocols, transport protocols, network analyze, network 
security
1. Introduction
Network steganography—type of steganography, in which secret data carriers 
use the network protocols of the OSI reference model—the open systems intercon-
nection network model. In general, network steganography is a family of methods 
for modifying data in the headers of network protocols and in the payload fields 
of packets, changing the structure of packet transmission and hybrid methods in a 
particular network protocol (and sometimes several at once).
The transfer of hidden data in network steganography is carried out through hid-
den channels. The term “covert channel” introduced by Simmons in 1983 determined 
that the problem of information leakage is not limited to the use of software. A covert 
channel can exist in any open channel in which there is some redundancy. The hidden 
data is called steganogram. They are located in a specific carrier (carrier).
In network steganography, the role of the carrier is carried out by the packet 
transmitted over the network. The main parameters of network steganography 
are the bandwidth, covert channel, probability of detection, and steganographic 
cost. Bandwidth is the amount of secret data that can be sent per unit of time. The 
probability of detection is determined by the possibility of detecting a steganogram 
in a particular carrier. The most popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyze 
the statistical properties of the data obtained and compare them with typical values 
for this carrier. Steganographic cost characterizes the degree of change in the carrier 
after exposure to the steganographic method.
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1.1 Network steganography methods
Baseline data for consideration classifications of methods and means of net-
work steganography come from the materials of Polish scientists Mazurczyk and 
Szczypiorski and reports on the experiments of Canadian scientists Ahsan and Kundur, 
scientists Cauich and Gomez of the University of California at Irvine, and researchers 
Handel and Sandford at the National laboratory at Los Amos. All materials are freely 
available. Network steganography methods can be divided into three groups [1]:
• Steganography methods, whose essence is in changing data in the fields of the 
network protocol headers and in the packets payload fields.
• Steganography methods, in which the structure of packet transmission 
changes, for example, the sequence of packet transmission or the intentional 
introduction of packet loss during transmission.
• Mixed (hybrid) methods of steganography—when they are used, the contents 
of the packages, the delivery times of the packages, and the order of their 
transfer change.
Each of these methods is divided into several groups; for example, package 
modification methods include three different methods:
• Methods for changing data in protocol header fields: they are based on modify-
ing the IP, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), SCTP header fields, and so on.
• Packet payload modification methods; in this case, various watermark algo-
rithms, speech codecs, and other steganographic techniques for hiding data are 
used.
• Methods of mixed techniques.
Methods for modifying the structure of gears and packages include three 
guidelines:
• Methods in which the order of the sequence of packets is changed.
• Methods that change the delay between packets.
• Methods, the essence of which is to introduce intentional packet loss by 
 skipping sequence numbers at the sender.
Mixed (hybrid) methods of steganography use two approaches: methods of 
audio packet loss (LACK) [2] and packet retransmission (RSTEG) [1].
The main idea of methods for modifying header fields is to use some header 
fields to add steganogram to them [3, 4]. This is possible due to some redundancy in 
these fields, that is, there are certain conditions in which the values in these fields 
will not be used in the transmission of packets. The most commonly used header 
fields are IP and TCP protocols.
Consider an example of a similar method based on modifying unused IP proto-
col fields to create a hidden channel [4].
The value of the “Identification” field of the IP packet is generated to the sender 
side. This number contains a random number that is generated when a package 
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is created. The “Identification” field is used only when fragmentation is used. 
Therefore, to use this method, you need to know the MTU value in the transmitted 
network and not exceed it, so that the packet is not fragmented during transmis-
sion. In the absence of the need for packet fragmentation, a certain redundancy 
occurs in the “Flags” field, in the second bit, which is responsible for setting the 
Don’t Fragment (DF) flag. It is possible to specify a flag notifying the sender’s 
unwillingness to fragment a packet. If the steganogram package is not fragmented 
due to its size, you can hide the information in the “DoNotFragmentBit” flag field. 
Using this method provides bandwidth of 1 bit.
The advantage of this method is the transmission of unchanged information 
from the sender to the recipient, but it also limits the amount of information sent. 
Steganography based on this method is easily implemented; has a good bandwidth, 
since you can send a lot of IP packets with the changes; and is low cost due to the use 
of fields that do not violate the functionality of the packet. Among the shortcom-
ings it should be noted that the transmitted data is contained in the open form and 
can be easily read by the observer (although it is possible to strengthen the protec-
tion using additional cryptography).
Another method of modifying network packets that alters the payload of a VoIP 
packet can be widely used in practice with the popularity of programs that provide 
voice and video communications over the Internet. The network steganography method 
designed to hide VoIP messages is called Transcoding Steganography (TranSteg), a 
network steganography method that compresses the payload of a network packet 
by transcoding. TranSteg can be used in other applications or services (e.g., stream-
ing video), where there is a possibility of compression (with or without losses) of 
open data. In TranSteg, data compression is used to make room for the steganogram: 
transcoding (lossy compression) of voice data from a high bitrate to a lower bitrate 
occurs with minimal loss of voice quality, and after compression, data is added to the 
free space in the payload package [5]. In general, the method allows to obtain more or 
less good steganographic bandwidth of 32 kb/s with the smallest difference in packet 
delay. Experiments of Polish scientists have shown that the delay in transmitting a VoIP 
packet using TranSteg increases by 1 ms, in contrast to a packet without a steganogram. 
The complexity of detection directly depends on the choice of the scenario and the 
conditions of the outside observer (e.g., its location). Among the shortcomings worth 
mentioning is the fact that this method is difficult to implement. It is necessary to find 
out which codecs the program uses for voice communication, to choose codecs with the 
smallest difference in speech quality, while giving more space for embedding stegano-
grams. During compression, the quality of the transmitted speech information is lost.
Also interesting is the direction using the mechanisms of the SCTP protocol. 
Stream control transport protocol (SCTP) [6] is a packet-based transport protocol, 
a new-level transport protocol that will replace TCP and User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) in future networks. Today, this protocol is implemented in operating 
systems such as BSD, Linux, HP-UX, and SunSolaris, supports network devices of 
the Cisco IOS operating system, and can be used in Windows. SCTP steganography 
uses new features of this protocol, such as multi-threading and the use of multiple 
interfaces (multi-homing).
The methods of SCTP steganography can be divided into three groups [7]:
• Methods in which the contents of SCTP packets change.
• Methods in which the sequence of transmission of SCTP packets is changed.
• Methods that affect both the content of packages and their order when 
 transfer (hybrid method).
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Methods for changing the contents of SCTP packets are based on the fact 
that each STCP packet is made up of parts and each of these parts can contain 
variable parameters. Regardless of the implementation, a statistical analysis 
of the addresses of the network cards used for the forwarded blocks can help 
in detecting hidden connections. Eliminating the possibility of applying this 
method, steganography can be achieved by changing the source and destina-
tion addresses in randomly selected packet, which is contained in the re-expel 
e PTO unit.
The essence of the hybrid method based on the SCTP protocol is to use certain 
protocol mechanisms that allow you to organize the intentional passing of packets 
in a stream without resending it. Later a steganogram is added to this packet, 
and it is resubmitted [7]. Modification of packages using a hybrid method can 
be presented on the Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks 
(HICCUPS), which uses the imperfections of data transmission in a network 
environment, such as interference and noise in a communication environment, as 
well as the usual susceptibility of data to distortion. HICCUPS is a steganographic 
system with bandwidth allocation in a public network environment. Wireless 
networks are more susceptible to data corruption than wired ones, so the use 
of noise and noise in the communication environment during system operation 
looks very tempting. “Listening” of all the frames with the transmitted data in the 
environment and the ability to send damaged frames with incorrectly corrected 
code values are two important network features necessary for the implementa-
tion of HICCUPS. In particular, wireless networks use an air connection with a 
variable bit error rate (BER), which makes it possible to introduce artificially 
damaged frames. This method has low bandwidth (network dependent), cumber-
some implementation, low steganographic cost, and high detection complexity. 
However, the frame analysis does not involve checksum may lead to the discovery 
of the use of Nogo given method.
The RSTEG method is based on the packet resending mechanism, the essence of 
which is as follows: when the sender sends a packet, the recipient does not respond 
with a confirmation flag; thus the packet resending mechanism should work, and 
the packet with the steganogram inside will be sent again, but confirmation does 
not come. The next time this mechanism is triggered, the original packet is sent 
without hidden attachments, to which the packet arrives with confirmation of 
successful receipt.
The performance of an RSTEG depends on many factors, such as the details of 
the communication procedures (in particular, the size of the packet payload, the 
frequency with which segments are generated, and so on).
The investigated method of steganography using packet retransmission RSTEG 
is a hybrid. Therefore, its steganographic bandwidth is approximately equal to the 
bandwidth of the methods with packet modification and at the same time higher 
than the methods of changing the order of packet transmission. The complexity 
of detection and throughput is directly related to the use of the implementation 
mechanism of the method. RSTEG based on RTO is characterized by high detec-
tion complexity and low bandwidth, while SACK has the maximum bandwidth for 
RSTEG, but is also more easily detected. The use RSTEG utilizing TCP protocol is 
a good choice for IP networks. Among the shortcomings, it should be noted that 
this method is difficult to implement, especially its scenarios, which are based on 
interception and correction of packets transmitted by ordinary users. Due to the 
dramatically increased frequency of retransmitted packets or the unusual occur-
rence of delays in the transmission of steganograms, a casual observer may be 
suspicious.
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Lost audio packets steganography (LACK)—steganography of deliber-
ate delay of audio packets [2]. This is another method implemented via 
VoIP. Communication over IP telephony consists of two parts: signaling (dialing) 
and conversational. Both parts of the traffic are transmitted in both directions. 
The signaling protocols used are SIP and RTP (with RTCP acting as the control 
protocol). This means that during the signaling phase of the call, the SIP end-
points (called user SIP agents) exchange some SIP messages. Usually SIP messages 
pass through SIP servers: proxy or redirected, which allows users to search and 
find each other. After this stage, the conversation phase begins, where the audio 
(RTP) stream goes to both directions between the caller and the callee. This 
method has certain advantages. The bandwidth is not less and sometimes higher 
than the other algorithms that use audio packets. But if you intentionally cause 
losses, the quality of the connection deteriorates, which can become suspicious 
for both ordinary users and listeners. Based on the presented steganalysis LACK 
methods, it can be concluded that the method has an average detection complex-
ity. The implementation of the method is too complex, but may not be possible 
within certain operating systems.
Table 1 shows a comparison of methods and their main characteristics 
and implementation. The position of each method in this table shows how 
much its characteristics are superior or inferior to the others. The higher the 
method displayed at the table, the more indicators of its characteristics. In the 
“Implementation” field, the simplicity of the organization of this method is 
considered. The less time and effort required by the implementation of this 
method, the higher its position in this title. Based on the data from Table 1, it can 
be concluded that the main characteristics are directly dependent on each other.
No Throughput ability 
steganography
Complexity 
discoveries
Steganography cost Implementation
1 TranSteg HICCUPS HICCUPS Modification header 
fields TCP and IP 
packets
2 LACK TranSteg LACK Modification data 
blocks in SCTP 
protocols
3 HICCUPS LACK RSTEG TranSteg
4 RSTEG RSTEG TranSteg Using SCTP 
multi-homing
5 Modification fields 
in TCP headers and 
IP packets
Using SCTP protocol 
(hybrid)
Protocol use SCTP 
(hybrid)
Using SCTP protocol 
(hybrid)
6 Modification data 
blocks in SCTP 
protocols
SCTP multi-homing Modification of 
blocks data in SCTP 
protocols
LACK
7 Using SCTP protocol 
(hybrid)
Modification fields in 
TCP headers and IP 
packets
SCTP multi-homing RSTEG
8 Using SCTP 
multi-homing
Modification data 
blocks in SCTP 
protocols
Modifying fields in 
TCP and IP headers 
packages
HICCUPS
Table 1. 
Comparison of network steganography methods.
Computer and Network Security
6
2. The combined method using modification of the fields IP and TCP
As mentioned earlier, the methods for modifying the IP and TCP header 
fields have certain features that make them stand out from the rest of the 
methods:
• The most common and standard protocols are used as carriers of the steganogram.
• Total gives bandwidth of 49 bits per 1 packet.
• Implemented on any operating system, the implementation does not require 
long adjustments and preparations.
• Changes in the package will not affect its behavior on the network, in case it 
will not be fragmented.
Despite the many advantages of both methods, there are some flaws, and the 
main one, to which attention is immediately drawn, is the obviousness of data 
transfer, i.e., any statistical analysis allows us to calculate both the hidden commu-
nication channel itself and the information transmitted in it.
The method proposed by Rowland [3] is as follows: to generate a value in the 
“Sequence Number” field, the plaintext character is encoded in accordance with 
the ASCII table, and the resulting value is multiplied by a certain number multiple 
of two. The resulting value is entered in the “Sequence Number” field and sent to 
the recipient. The recipient, knowing the key (divider), should check all incoming 
TCP packets for the subject of the steganogram, dividing the value of the “Sequence 
number” field by the key.
On the one hand, this method allows you to create a data channel through which 
you can transmit secret data in front of a passive observer. But the existence of a 
single key is a disadvantage, since, based on a dozen of such packages, it can be 
concluded that the sequence numbers of all packages have a common factor, which 
is the key. Thus, the proposed method is easy to detect.
Based on the source data and analysis of the disadvantages of network stegan-
ography methods with modification of the IP and TCP packet header fields, we can 
propose a modified method that will be based on the simultaneous use of the IP and 
TCP protocol header fields. The key needed to decrypt the transmitted message will 
also be transmitted as a steganogram, only in encrypted form in the “Identifier” 
field of the IP header, while the encrypted steganogram will be transmitted in the 
“Sequence number” field of the TCP header.
The implementation of this method is divided into two parts:
• Preparing data for the transfer, which includes generating the key k, convert-
ing the transmitted secret symbol or number into its corresponding code in the 
ASCII table, and calculating the value of the carrier C, which is an encrypted 
steganogram.
• Entering data into the corresponding TCP and IP header fields.
The first block consists of the following steps:
• Generation of the key k, which will be used in the future. The key can be any 
number that is a multiple of two. To generate a key, take two numbers x and y 
and raise the first to the power of the second.
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• The conversion of secret data—a character or number that must be transferred 
to the corresponding code in the ASCII table. The coded number is denoted 
by S, since it is our steganogram.
• Getting the media C as the product of the key value by the value of a secret 
character.
C = S*k10
• Checking the number C—it must meet the requirement 228 < C < 233. This con-
dition is necessary so that the value of the “Sequence number” field does not 
look suspicious. If the value of C does not meet the requirements, the numbers 
x and y need to be changed to others, and repeat steps 1–2. Further studies will 
be conducted on the automatic formation of x, y.
• The value of the numbers x and y is written together into the number z and is 
flipped so that the previous values can only be read from right to left.
Then the data is converted from decimal to hexadecimal. Thus, we get a three-
digit hexadecimal number inv. (z) 16.
Then, at the second stage, you need to put the obtained values  of the encrypted 
key and steganogram into the TCP and IP header fields.
We briefly describe the network steganography method with a modification 
of the fields in the TCP header, since in it we will transmit the secret message 
itself. For the purpose of steganography, the header of this protocol usually uses 
some fields that can be changed without losing the functionality of the package. 
For the purpose of our research, we will focus on the “Sequence Number” field 
(SN, SequenceNumber). This field performs two tasks. The first is the follow-
ing: if the SYN flag is set, then this initial value of the sequence number is ISN 
(InitialSequenceNumber), and the first byte of data that will be transmitted in the 
next packet will have a sequence number equal to ISN + 1. Otherwise, if SYN is not 
set, the first byte of data transmitted in this packet has this sequence number. For 
our case it is important to know that this value will not change during the path of 
the packet from the sender to the recipient.
The “Sequence Number” field allows you to create a 32-bit length sequence. 
According to the Rowland method, the transmitted message is encoded in accor-
dance with the ASCII table and multiplied by a certain number (the key), a multiple 
of two to reduce the detection probability, then entered into the generated TCP 
packet in the “Sequence number” field, and the packet is sent. When the packet 
reaches the destination address, the recipient must save all incoming TCP packets, 
from which he must remove the value in the “Sequence number” field and then 
divide by the key he knows in advance. But, as it was said before, this method is 
extremely easy to detect based on the analysis of a number of TCP packets due 
to a permanent key. In the proposed modification of the method, this key will be 
transmitted simultaneously with the TCP packet, in the IP header. This will increase 
the difficulty of detecting the steganogram.
The next step is to add the value of the C media in the “Sequence Number” field 
of the TCP header.
Next, you must enter the value of the encrypted key (inv (z)) 16 in the IP header 
field. To organize such an operation, you should return to the network steganogra-
phy method with modification of the IP header fields. During the packet path, only 
the “Identifier” field remains unchanged; its length is 16 bits and 1 bit in the “Flags” 
field, which is responsible for the DF flag. Changing these fields does not carry 
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changes in the package, in case the package is not fragmented, but it should not be, 
since by condition we need to know the minimum MTU value and not exceed it 
when creating and sending the package.
At the “Identifier” field, 16 bits is available to us for adding a steganogram; the 
information in it is displayed in the form of four numbers in hexadecimal number 
system. Thus, we have 65,535 possible values that can be used both for transmitting 
the steganogram and for the key, which in turn is also a steganogram. In order not to 
transmit the key in such an explicit form, it is proposed to use only three numbers 
out of four, while reading them from right to left. In this case, the number can be 
odd with its standard reading from left to right. The fourth unused number can take 
any value. Thus, we can use only 16 of the 17 bits available in a packet. It is proposed 
to use the second bit in the “Flags” field—DF—as a specific label, the presence 
of which allows you to expand the key extraction algorithm: whether you need to 
read the value from the first or from the second number in the “Identifier” field to 
extract the key.
Thus, the next step is to enter (inv (z)) 16 in the “Identifier” field of the IP 
header. At the same time, we must set the value of “1” to the second bit in the 
“Flags” field if we enter the key in the first 12 bytes of the “Identifier” field or 
0 if we fill the first 4 bytes of the field with random values and in the remaining 
12 bytes our key.
Next, we send a packet with modified fields to the recipient, where he must 
carry out the procedure inversely described in the framework of this algorithm [8].
We calculate the bandwidth of the proposed method.
Since the “Identifier” field in the IP header can contain 16 bits of information, 1 bit 
is available in the “Flags” field, and in the “Sequence number” field, a 32-bit informa-
tion is available in the TCP header; we can conclude that the total throughput of steg-
anography is 49 bits. But it should be noted that in this method we use the “Identifier” 
field to transmit the encrypted key in the steganogram, which is used to extract secret 
information from the “Sequence number” field, and the bit in the “Flags” field is used 
as a label. Thus, to transfer the encrypted key, we allocate 12 bits of information avail-
able in the “Identifier” field, and in the remaining 4 bits, we enter a random number 
from 0 to 16 in the hexadecimal number system (from 1 to F) and use 1 bit as a label, 
necessary for more organization more flexible operation of the algorithm. Based on 
this, we can conclude that for transmitting specific information, we have 32 bits left 
in the “Sequence number” field, and 3 bits of secret information can be transmitted, 
which is encrypted in 32 bits of information hiding the secret.
2.1 Intercomputer exchange
The exchange of computer networks is based on the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) reference model.
Studying hidden information flows with computer interaction on networks of 
interest will include information about the services that are added to the network 
traffic data. As part of the protocol, headings are assessed at two levels: network 
and transport. We will address network protocols (IPv4 and IPv6) and transport 
protocols (TCP and UDP).
Further, we are considering the reports and the possibility of more detailed 
manipulation.
2.2 IPv4
IPv4 is the most popular protocol of network level; see more information in 
RFC791.
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The header size of IPv4 is 20 bytes; using specialized field in header—“Options” 
field—can increase it. When the amount of the header is less than 20 bytes, it is 
likely damaged and has to be discarded.
2.3 Header of IPv4
The format of IPv4 header is presented in Figure 1.
IPv4 header field analysis shows the following results:
1. “Internet Header Length” field. Ability to increase the size of the Internet 
Header Length field to extend the original header. This change allows you to 
add data to the next two “Options” and “Padding” fields.
2. “Type of Service” field
Bits from 0 to 2 are set for priority and 6 to 7 set to reserved.
-0-2:
 The value “111” should not appear on the networks of provider; it could be 
appearing only for local networks, which leads to the point that the capture of 
this value in the network provider is a mark of malicious information injection.
-6-7:
 By default, these bits are reserved and must be set to 0; the result is that the 
other value is possible injection information.
3. “Identification” field
 You can change the value of the identification field. The point is that the field 
is used to build correctly after fragmentation, but there is a DF flag that rejects 
fragment packets, so if the flag is set to “1” this ID is not required, and this field 
could be used to pass hidden information.
4. “Flags” field
 As the standard requires, the first bit is reserved and should be set to “0”; 
if the result is different, it is mark of injection information.
Figure 1. 
Header of IPv4.
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5. “Fragment Offset” field
 You can change the value of the “Fragment Offset” field. The best option is 
when the DF flag is set to “0,” since the fragmentation strategy is designed so 
that an unfragmented datagram in all fields related to fragmentation has zero 
values. This means, despite the fact that the flag prevents fragmentation, we 
can still implement it in the offset of the fragment, but the fact of identifica-
tion of the manipulation becomes more detectable.
6. “Source Address” field
You can change the “Source Address” field value.
7. It should be noted that manipulation is possible only on the condition that the 
package consists of hidden source data. Since the manipulation will not be 
caused by the source of the information, the receiving site could not properly 
build the packets.
8. “Destination Address” field
 IPv4-in IPv6 headers can be encapsulated using the IPv4 Destination Address 
field to insert information into it. In this case, the IPv6 header will be respon-
sible for delivering the package.
9. “Options” field
 The value of the options field is limited in the IPv4 header, and as a result of 
the analysis, we are trying to determine any field value that may appear in 
this type of field. So we may try to determine the incorrect significant of this 
field, the appearance of which indicates the possible malicious activity on the 
injection of information.
10. “Padding” field
 This field goes after value 0x00 of the “Options” field; the value is the EOL 
and takes up to 32-bit header boundaries. The interest in this manipulation 
is that after the optional EOL, the equipment does not examine headers on 
32-bit boundaries; this means that these bytes are invisible to network devices 
and sniffer. Although the analysis of this field is simple enough, the EOL up 
to 32-bit header boundaries must be set to “0” at the standard behind the 
“Options” field, causing any other value of this field to indicate that the data is 
being injected.
2.4 Injection’s result
The standard IPv4 header size with options and fields with padding is 320 bits. 
Two different options need to be considered:
1. IPv4 is a carrier and is responsible for packet addressing. Due to manipulation, 
182 bits can be used, which is 56.88% of the total number of bits. This volume 
allows you to insert 22 symbols from 8 bits in ASCII encoding into the header. 
11
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So after calculations we have got a value up to 4 bits. This remainder is part of 
the other 8 bits of the transmitted information.
2. IPv4 is a passenger, it’s an IPv4 encapsulated header in other headers, such as 
IPv6 or GRE. In this case, the method for implementing the target address can 
be used. As a result, handling bits 214, 66% of the total number of bits can be 
used. This volume allows you to implement a 26-character header with 8 bits 
in ASCII encoding. Thus, after calculations, a value of 6 bits is obtained. The 
treated residue was included in an additional 8 bits of the transmitted symbol.
2.5 IPv6
2.5.1 Header of IPv6
The header’s format of IPv6 is presented in Figure 2.
1. “Traffic Class” field
 You can change the “Traffic Class” value arbitrarily. This manipulation cannot 
be detected by analysis.
2. “Flow description” field
You can change the value of the “Flow Label” field.
This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet sniffer.
3. “Load Length” field
 It is possible to increase the size of this field when adding data to the end of 
the original IP packet, like IPv4. This modification cannot be detected by the 
packet sniffer.
Figure 2. 
Header format of IPv6.
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4. “Source Address” field
 You have the possibility to change the data of this field at IPv4 format, but 
international standards from the IPv6 community do not recommend using it 
as a source address.
5. “Destination Address” field
 In this protocol, you can use the IPv6 “Destination Address” field in the IPv4 
encapsulation header to load information into it. In this case, the IPv4 header 
will be responsible for the packet delivery.
This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet sniffer.
3. Result of injection
The standard IPv6 header size with options and fields with padding is 320 bits. 
Two different options need to be considered:
1. IPv6 is a carrier, that is, it is responsible for addressing the package. As a result 
of the manipulations described above, 156 bits can be used, which is 48.75% 
of the total number of bits. This volume allows you to insert a caption with 19 
characters from 8 bits into the ASCII character set. Thus, after calculations get 
a value of 4 bits. The treated residue was included in an additional 8 bits of the 
transmitted symbol.
2. IPv6 is a passenger and is transmitted by IPv6 encapsulation header to other 
headers, such as IPv4 or GRE. In this case, the method for implementing the 
target address can be used. As a result of the manipulations described above, it 
is possible to use 284 bits, which is 88.75% of the total number of bits. This vol-
ume allows you to implement a 35-character header with 8 bits in ASCII. Thus, 
after calculations, we get a possible value of 4 bits. The processed remainder 
will be added as an additional 8 bits of transmitted characters.
3.1 TCP
Transmission Control Protocol is a reliable protocol of transport layer. TCP is 
oriented to establish a logical connection, that is, the hosts negotiate and create a 
session and then begin to transfer data. Every time a package is sent, the sender is 
awaiting acknowledgement of delivery receipt. This protocol is standardized by 
RFC 793.
3.1.1 Header of TCP
Header’s format of TCP is presented in Figure 3.
“Source Port” field
1. You can change the “Source Port” field value. Processing is only possible 
when the package was a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations that 
occur on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly 
assemble the original packet. This manipulation cannot be detected by the 
packet sniffer.
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2. “Destination Port” field
 You can change the value of “Destination Port” field. Handling is only possible 
when the packet was a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations that occur 
on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly assemble the 
original packet. This modification cannot be detected by sniffer.
3. “Sequence Number” field
 We could modify the information in this field. Processing is only possible when 
the package was a source of hidden data. Because of the modification that had 
occurred at the source device, the receiving PC cannot correctly build the 
original packets. This modification cannot be observed by the network sniffer.
4. “Acknowledgment Number” field
 We could change the contents of this field. Modification is allowed provided 
that the package was made up source of hidden data. Due to the modification 
that occurred on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to prop-
erly assemble the original packet.
5. “Data Offset” field
 The manipulation is as follows: this increases the size of the “Data Offset” 
field, expands the TCP header, and adds a parameter field. In the options you 
can add data after byte 0x00 EOL.
 At standard byte 0x00 EOL, bytes with a value of “0” should be due to some 
other value that indicates that a data injection has occurred.
6. “Reserved” field
You can modify the value of this field.
 By default, the values of all standard bits must be set to “0” as a result of some 
other values that indicate that a data injection has been occurred.
Figure 3. 
Header format TCP.
Computer and Network Security
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7. “Window” field
 You can modify the value of the “Window” field. Handling is only possible 
when the packet was built at a hidden data source. Due to the manipulations 
that occur on the source host, the receiving party will not be able to properly 
assemble the original packet
8. “Pointer Urgent” field
 You can modify the value of this field. This injection is only possible if all URG 
options are present.
 So, if the Urgent Pointer is filled in and the flag of URG is not setting, it means 
that the Urgent Pointer is not used correctly.
9. “Options” field
We could modify the data of this field. In the options, you can realize the data 
after value 0x00, but it is not considered after this byte header data.
TCP header option values are limited, and network analysis results in attempt-
ing to identify a possible option that attempts to identify incorrectly filled 
options or unknown options whose appearance indicates a possible injection of 
information.
10. “Padding” field
It is possible to fill the field of any padding.
 It should be noted that manipulation is only possible if the package is made up 
of hidden source data. Because of the manipulation that occurs at the source, 
the receiving party cannot properly collect packets.
Handling “Padding” is one of the most interesting. The “Padding” field starts 
after the 0x00 in the “Options” field; the value is the EOL option and takes up to 
32-bit header boundaries. Interest in this manipulation is contained in the following 
text after the EOL does not produce a 32-bit header, which means that these bytes 
are invisible to network devices and sniffer. Although the analysis of this field is 
simple enough, the EOL up to 32-bit header boundaries must be set to “0” at the 
standard behind the “Options” field, causing any other value of this field to indicate 
that the data is being injected.
4. Result of injection
The standard TCP header field with options and fall is 192 bits. As a result of 
the above actions, you can use up to 150 bits, which is 78.13% of the total number 
of bits in the original, unmodified header. This amount of data allows the use of 
18 characters in an 8-bit header in the standard ASCII character set. Therefore, 
after all the calculations, we get the maximum possible amount equal to 6 bits. The 
processed piece of information was included in the next 8 bits of the transmitted 
symbol.
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4.1 UDP
User Datagram Protocol is a connectionless transport layer protocol. No con-
nection setup is created before transferring between hosts. This protocol is less 
reliable than TCP, but gives a higher transfer rate with less overhead. This protocol 
is standardized by RFC 768.
4.1.1 Header field of UDP
Header’s format of UDP is presented in Figure 4.
“Source Port” field
1. You can change the “Source Port” field value. Processing is only possible when 
the package was a hidden data source. Because of the manipulation that had 
occurred at the source device, the receiving party cannot properly assemble 
the original packets. This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet 
sniffer.
2. “Destination Port” field
 You can change the “Target Port” field value. Processing is only possible when 
the package was created by a hidden data source. Due to the manipulation 
of the device generating the packages, the receiving party cannot correctly 
assemble the source packages. This modification cannot be detected by the 
network sniffer.
3. “Length” field
 We could change the significance of the “Length” field. Increasing the value of 
this field has also increased the size of the package, so we can change the fields 
of data octets by appending to the end of datagram.
So processing is possible when the package was a source of hidden data. So if the 
modification had occurred at the source device, the receiving host cannot properly 
assemble the original packets. This manipulation cannot be detected by the packet 
sniffer.
Figure 4. 
Header of UDP.
Computer and Network Security
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5. Result of injection
The size of the UDP header of the datagram is 64 bits; as a result of the described 
changes, you can use 32 bits, which is 50% of the total number of bits in the header, 
which allows you to implement a 4–8-bit header in the ASCII character set.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we began to develop methods and special software for generating 
bitstreams in order to organize a secure connection.
This software method was implemented in software, ensuring secure network 
communication. The main part of the program model is a detector program for 
analyzing network traffic to search for possible hidden transmissions. The analysis 
is implemented by checking the header in compliance with the standards, which is 
needed to identify unauthorized values for specific areas of the PDU.
The surveys revealed possible vulnerabilities that could embed relevant infor-
mation in the puncture headers we reviewed. Table 2 presents the quantification of 
the study results, showing the remainder is the number of bits that are part of the 
next 8 bits of the transmitted symbol.
It should be noted that TCP was created as a reliable protocol for delivery, but 
after entering the hidden data by the TCP header proposed above, changes made to 
the header fields of the TCP lead to the loss of the functionality of a reliable proto-
col, making it similar to the UDP.
In the created model, the transmission of one packet is realized, that is, the full 
message is embedded in all possible of headers at only one datagram. In order to 
see the maximum feasible messaging, we chose the following protocols: IPv4, IPv6, 
and TCP. Note that for simplicity, TCP header data is not included in the fragment 
offset. Thus, thanks to the proposed manipulation, the programming model uses 
603 bits, which is 74.04% of the total number of bits in the order of three headers. 
This volume allows you to enter 75 characters out of 8 bits in ASCII encoding.
Protocol Size of injection 
information (bits)
Percentage of the total 
header size (%)
The number of 
symbols
Rest 
bits
IPv4 (carrier) 182 56.88 22 6
IPv4 (passenger) 214 66 26 6
IPv6 (carrier) 156 48.75 19 4
IPv6 (passenger) 284 88.75 35 4
TCP 150 78.13 18 6
UDP 32 50 4 0
Table 2. 
The quantification of the study results.
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